"Walking" with the SDL – Part 3

Jeremy Dallman here. This is Part Three in my multi-part series on “Walking” with the Security Development Lifecycle (SDL) [Part 1, Part 2]. So far I have discussed getting management approval and expanding security training. In this post I will discuss formalizing requirements and effective ways to reuse your threat model and attack surface review data. I’ll wrap up with a look into final security reviews and managing post-release documentation.

 

Formalize Requirements for long-term use

 

Now that you are making security development a lifecycle, it is time to lock down and formalize your security requirements. At this point, you need to take what you’ve learned and begin translating your security principles into something that can apply to multiple releases and multiple levels of your development process.

 

At a product level, you need to use the security rules created in prior projects to define long-term security requirements. Those requirements will become your core security policies.  Then, at the version level, you should create security requirements that are version-specific and are defined by the security objectives and features you want to address in that version.

 

Both of these sets of requirements can be formalized in a way that makes them easier to transfer across future product cycles and to modify based on the unique features or security issues of each version.  Making these a staple of your development lifecycle will also ease adoption of these requirements as team become familiar with them over multiple releases.

 

I would like to touch on one topic before moving on – enforcing requirements. As your team grows and your SDL matures, there is an inherent complexity that comes with managing and enforcing your requirements. In our experience, we’ve found that it is critical to identify a security advisor. Up until now, your company has probably had someone championing security and best practices – either as a formal role or simply as a informal advocate. However, making it a feature of your lifecycle requires dedicated effort to enforce and sustain the requirements as well as monitoring the security ecosystem for changes that may add requirements to your process. The security advisor(s) are the people who will help guide the creation of the security requirements both broadly and for each product cycle; for a smaller team, this may be a single individual. For a larger organization, a team of people may be needed. The security advisor should also evaluate your security policy and apply changes where needed, ensure the product bug database is tracking security issues that can be reviewed later (I’ll get to the Final Security Review in our next post), and guide the definition and enforcement of a security “bug bar”.

 

Security requirements serve as the backbone of your SDL. The amount of effort you put in defining and enforcing requirements, and keeping them up to date with the current threat landscape will have a direct return on investment in the security and privacy of the product you create. Be careful to document and clearly communicate your requirements to your team, and use them as evidence when talking to your customers about how you ensure the security and privacy of your product.

 

Reference & Reuse Threat Modeling results & Attack Surface Reviews

 

Your developers and testers should have access to and be familiar with the attack surface analysis or threat model documents you have created. These documents are invaluable reference tools. Use them to perform evaluate your security from multiple angles:

 

·         Think about component-level architecture

 

·         List common pitfalls in writing code, or begin defining and building test cases.

 

·         Code reviewers can reference threat models and attack surface documents to verify specific attacks were addressed in the code.

 

·         Architects can use them to identify new areas of potential attack surface based on how new code is written or interacts with existing code.

 

·         Project leadership can reference threat models or attack surface documents to ensure the completed project meets all security goals.

 

Building a “live” library of threat models that is accessible by everyone and is designed to be easily maintained or updated is a big undertaking. Based on experience, I would strongly encourage doing this early in the evolution of your security lifecycle to avoid losing valuable data and to prevent the sheer volume of data from becoming unusable. I have heard of some companies using wiki technology as their library for threat modeling while others may use searchable documents, spreadsheets, or websites to store/sort/share the information. Whatever method you use, it is important to anticipate the accumulation of a large set of information that should be easily used and shared across the organization.

 

I would like to do a deeper dive on the importance of security code reviews as part of your “walk” evolution. Security code reviews focus on identifying insecure coding techniques and vulnerabilities that could lead to security issues. The goal of a review is to identify as many potential security vulnerabilities as possible before the code is deployed. The cost and effort of fixing security flaws at development time is far less than fixing them later in the product deployment cycle [from Improving Web Application Security]. You should create a process where top security developers actively review code within the context of known threats prior to deploying your code. Leveraging the existing documentation about feature design is a vital reference piece to make those security reviews successful.

 

Later this week, I’ll close the series with a look at final security reviews (FSRs) and how to document your work for post-release and next-release reference.

 

In the meantime, we’d like to hear from you:

 

?        How do you express your security requirements? Do you use a checklist, a whitepaper, or something else?

 

?        What challenges have you faced in enforcing requirements across your teams?

 

?        How have you implemented threat models or attack surface reviews?